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ON YOUR FIRST DAY, PRESIDENT TRUMP, PLEASE 
REPEAL THE IMMUNIZATION OF GUN SELLERS ACT† 
Frank J. Vandall∗ 
The purpose of this edition of the Emory Corporate Governance and 
Accountability Review is to suggest what needs to be done during the first few 
days of President Trump’s new administration. The first act should be the 
repeal of the Protection in Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCA) (2005).1 In 
essence this is a ban on suits against corporations that manufacture guns. Gun 
manufacturers are the experts and need to be brought into the gun safety 
debate. When at fault, they should be held liable. 
Congress nailed the doors to the Courthouse closed in 2005. The Gun 
Manufacturers Immunity Law (PLCA) (2005) protects gun manufacturers from 
suit. One of the arguments against the passing of the “Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act” (PLCA) was that the bill prevented the victims of gun 
violence from having their day in court.2 Senator Jack Reed noted how a bill 
that protected firearms manufacturers from civil liability would prevent those 
who lost loved ones to gun violence from seeking justice. 3  Senator Reed 
presented the case of Conrad Johnson, saying, “Conrad Johnson was the bus 
driver who was killed by the Washington area snipers. The snipers’ Bushmaster 
 
 † Portions of this paper were presented to the Emory faculty. I appreciate the comments of Tom Arthur, 
Debbie Dinner and Sasha Volokh. 
A short version appeared in the Daily Report, February 5, 2016. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1964, Washington and Jefferson College; J.D. 
1967 Vanderbilt University School of Law; L.L.M. 1968, S.J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 1 This bill provides tort immunity for gun manufacturers from civil suit. Protection of Lawful Commerce 
in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (PLCA) (2005). 
Other gun safety measures must also be adopted: 
a) Insurance for all guns, so innocent parties who are injured can recover from the shooter at fault. 
b) Registration of all guns—like cars. This is to enable bad persons to be found and prosecuted—like 
automobiles used in bank robberies. 
c) Storage of “rapid fire” guns in an armory. Military posts require this. 
d) Guns can only be transported in a locked box in the trunk. Avoids accidental shootings and “drive 
by” shootings. 
e) Warning sign—Caution gun inside. To warn neighbors with children and deter potential thieves. 
f) Encourage corporations to develop “smart guns.” Hand guns only work if a unique ring or bracelet 
is in very close proximity. 
g) Close the “gun show” loophole. 
 2 151 CONG. REC. S8915 (daily ed. July 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reed). 
 3 Id. 
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assault rifle was one of more than 230 guns that disappeared from the Bull’s 
Eye Shooter Supply gun store in Washington State. The gun store’s careless 
oversight of firearms in its inventory raised serious questions of negligence that 
fully deserved to be explored by the civil courts.”4 Bringing a torts suit was 
forbidden by the PLCA however. Senator Reed’s point was that the PLCA 
wrongly immunized the gun store from judicial examination by means of a suit. 
This Paper will manifest that laws immunizing gun manufacturers and 
sellers prevent victims of gun violence from asserting their rights. This is 
premised on the simple idea that the negligent gun merchant, felonious shooter, 
or both, owe a duty to the decedent. When a thief shoots a victim, or when an 
enraged spouse shoots his wife, the shooter has acted as prosecutor, judge and 
jury. The victim is dead without ever having access to the courts to plead her 
case. The handgun provides instant death or serious injury. Mr. Conrad 
Johnson and his family were unable to obtain justice because of the PLCA. 
The negligent gun store owner was immunized from tort liability by the PLCA. 
Today, because of the lobbying strength of the gun manufacturers and the 
NRA, there is no meaningful debate of gun safety. 
Congress passed the PLCA in less than a year and was very much influenced 
by the National Rifle Association and the numerous arms manufacturers. I 
predict that not a word in the PLCA will be changed in 2017. The path forward 
in regard to gun safety must then rest with the civil justice bar. To reduce the 
carnage, hand guns and rapid fire weapons must be restricted to the home for 
self-defense purposes. Thus “carry everywhere laws” that encourage taking 
guns outside the home, such as Georgia’s, must be challenged in court as being 
unconstitutional. 
In terms of the numbers of deaths from gun violence, it is as if we are at 
war. War is safer than living in the United States. About 15,000 people die 
from gun violence each year. That amounts to 150,000 gun deaths every 10 
years. In comparison about 60,000 American military personnel were killed in 
Vietnam, about 4,000 in Iraq over 10 years, and 132 American soldiers were 
killed in Afghanistan in 2013.5 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 U.S. Military Casualties—Vietnam Conflict Casualty Summary, DEF. CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYS., 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_vietnam_sum.xhtml (last accessed Dec. 23, 2014); U.S. Military 
Casualties—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Military Deaths—All, DEF. CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYS., 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oif_all.xhtml (last accessed Dec. 23, 2014); U.S. Military 
Casualties—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Casualty Summary by Month and Service, DEF. 
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A gun is the most dangerous thing you can bring into your home. A person 
in the home is four times more likely to be shot and killed than an intruder.6 
Each year approximately 10,000 children are killed or injured by gun violence 
in the United States.7 Women are most at risk, to be sure. If a domestic abuser 
has access to a gun, a woman is 500% more likely to be killed than if no gun is 
present.8 To put the issue into today’s context, the prosecutor involved in the 
Ferguson Missouri grand jury report said that Officer Wilson shot Michael 
Brown because he feared that Brown was armed.9 
Thus, more guns on the street will lead to the police fearing more guns on 
suspects and in vehicles. One reason the firemen refused to put out the fires in 
Ferguson, Missouri was that they heard shots and feared that they would be 
shot.10 
More guns carried outside the home will make the police more likely to 
shoot a suspect. Recently, an officer shot a 12-year-old child in Cleveland, Ohio 
because he was pointing a gun at people.11 In fact, it turned out to be a toy 
gun.12 
I. THE GEORGIA CARRY GUNS EVERYWHERE ACT 
In April 2014, the Georgia legislature passed a bill that permits carrying 
handguns and rifles in restaurants, churches, and school parking lots.13 I argue 
 
CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYS., https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml (last accessed 
Dec. 23, 2014). 
 6 Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 45 J. TRAUMA 263 
(1998). 
 7 Clare Kim, Nearly 10,000 American Children Are Injured or Killed by Guns Every Year, MSNBC (Jan. 
28, 2014, 1:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/the-last- word/the-toll-gun-violence-children. 
 8 J.C. Campbell et al., Risk factors for femicide within physically abusive intimate relationships:results 
from a multi-site case control study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003). 
 9 See Transcript of Grand Jury Volume V at 227–28, State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (Sept. 16, 2014); 
Russel Berman, Darren Wilson: ‘I Just Did My Job’, ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archiv e/2014/11/i-just-did-m y-job/383227/ .
 10 See Ferguson Protests: Firefighters turned back by gunfire, NJ.COM (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2014/11/ferguson_protests_firefighters.html.  
 11 Emma G. Fitzsimmons, 12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2014, at A12. 
 12 Id. 
 13 The “carry” everywhere act permits guns to be taken into restaurants. Open Carry Protection Act, 2014 
Ga. Laws Act 604, § 16-11-127 (b) (2014) (identifying only 6 locations where carrying a weapon is 
“unauthorized”). Starbucks has asked gun owners to keep guns outside. Howard Schultz, An Open Letter from 
Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks Coffee Company, STARBUCKS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.starbucks.com/ 
blog/an-open-letter-from-howard-schultz-ceo-of-starbucks-coffee-company/1268. 
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that the act rests on flawed policies and is unconstitutional. Briefly put, the so-
called “Safe Carry Protection Act” allows individuals to carry firearms 
anywhere in Georgia, subject to only a few exceptions. Under the new law, 
firearms are only prohibited within 150 feet of a polling place, on the premises 
of a nuclear power facility, inside state mental health facilities, and inside of a 
school building.14 As long as the proprietor does not forbid it, firearms may be 
carried in restaurants, bars, and all similar places of public accommodation.15 
The same goes for churches.16 You may find yourself dining in a fine restaurant 
and the next patron over carrying an AK 47. 
Furthermore, individuals may carry firearms into any government building 
so long as “ingress into such building is not restricted or screened by security 
personnel.”17 With regard to schools, firearms may be carried so long as the 
weapon is “under the possessor’s control in a motor vehicle or in a locked 
compartment of a motor vehicle or in a locked container or in a locked firearms 
rack which is on a motor vehicle.” Teachers are also allowed to carry firearms in 
their vehicles on school property. Essentially, the act allows individuals to 
possess firearms on any school parking lot, so long as they are not actually a 
student at the school. Even if a licensed individual is caught carrying a firearm 
inside of a school, in violation of the new law, he or she is guilty of only a 
misdemeanor.18 
While the law does include a licensing requirement to carry weapons in 
public, the provision is phony. The Act forbids application forms from 
requiring “gun serial numbers or other identification capable of being used as 
a de facto registration of firearms.” Also, while there is a provision preventing 
individuals who have been inpatients at a mental health facility, or adjudicated 
 
Kroger has said that guns are welcome. Steve Inskeep, Kroger Policy Attracts Pro and Anti-Gun 
Advocates, NPR (Sept. 08, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/08/346735594/kroger-policy-attracts-pro-and-
anti-gun-advocates (noting Kroger’s “policy of following local and state gun carrying laws”). 
Forty-five states permit the carrying of handguns outside the home. “Thirty-one states without any 
license or permit. . . . Fifteen states require some form of license or permit in order to openly carry a handgun.” 
Open Carrying, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/ 
firearms-in-public-places/open-carrying/ (last visited 11/13/2016). 
 14 Open Carry Protection Act, 2014 Ga. Laws Act 604, § 16-11-127 (2014). 
 15 Id. The disgust will resemble the past when smoking was permitted in restaurants. We had much to 
fear from side draft smoke (but did not know). Isn’t alcohol consumed in bars? Don’t people in bars get 
intoxicated? 
 16 Id. Isn’t church for peaceful worship and reflection? 
 17 Id. Why aren’t legislators permitted to carry guns inside? 
 18 Id. Students risk being shot in their parking lots. 
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not guilty by reason of insanity from getting a carry license, the Act contains a 
petitioning procedure by which they still may receive a license to carry.19 
In reality, though, these licensing requirements are a mere façade, as “[a] 
person carrying a weapon shall not be subject to detention for the sole purpose 
of investigating whether such person has a weapons carry license.”20 In other 
words, anyone could carry a firearm into one of the myriad places allowed by 
law, and a police officer would have no legal way of knowing whether that 
individual was permitted to do so. Furthermore, if an unlicensed individual were 
to shoot someone in “[d]efense of self or others,” it would act as an absolute 
defense to any criminal liability under the licensing provisions.21 
The law even limits law enforcement’s ability to respond to gun violence in 
an emergency. The Act states that, even “pursuant to a declared state of 
emergency,” no official may seize any legal firearm, prohibit possession of any 
firearm, require the registration of any firearm, or even prohibit the carrying of 
any firearm; clearly, the Act eliminates the value of firearms registration.22 
The Georgia “guns everywhere” law has not yet been judicially reviewed. 
Because of this, and because the new Congress will not consider the repeal of 
the PLCA, the constitutionality of the “guns everywhere” law calls for careful 
evaluation. This paper argues that the act is unconstitutional on four grounds: 
due process, equal protection, access to court and special legislation. 
II. DUE PROCESS 
When someone is shot and killed, the shooter is the judge, the jury and the 
executioner. The victim has not received “due process” in terms of a preliminary 
hearing or trial. For example, Tom rapidly approaches Sam in a dark alley and 
Sam feels threatened and shoots Tom in self-defense. But what if Tom was 
mentally challenged, drunk or insane? Or, Sam was never at risk? Tom is now 
dead and never received “due process” before his death; he never received an 
opportunity to defend his actions on the basis that he was mentally ill.23 
 
 19 Id. Why must the recently insane be permitted to carry a gun outside? This is a clear example of 
“overkill” on the part of gun supporting legislators. 
 20 § 16-11-137. 
 21 Id. If the gun were stolen and used in a crime, there would be no way to trace it back to the owner. 
 22 Id. “Why are gun owners apprehensive of registration?” 
 23 Defining due process as “established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private 
rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case”. Due 
Process, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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Due process can be divided into two classes, procedural and substantive. 
A. Procedural Due Process 
The Georgia legislature snuck the “carry law” through on the last day of the 
session.24 It was entirely different than the bill that had been debated for the 
previous six months.25 Therefore the passage of the bill violated procedural due 
process in that it was never read or debated by the legislature prior to passage.26 
Professor John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda had this to say about 
“procedural” due process: 
When the Court reviews a law to determine its procedural 
fairness, it reviews the system of decision-making to determine 
whether or not a government entity has taken an individual’s life, 
liberty, or property without the fair procedure or “due process” 
required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.27 
. . . 
It is important to realize that procedural review is limited in 
scope. Procedural due process guarantees only that there is a fair 
decision-making process before the government takes some action 
directly impairing a person’s life, liberty or property.28 
 
 24 Larry Copeland & Doug Richards, Ga. Governor Signs ‘Guns Everywhere’ into Law, U.S.A. TODAY 
(Apr. 23, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/23/georgia-gun-law/8046315/. 
“The law, once contained a bill from the House and the Senate. . . . A lack of transparency among legislators 
left . . . organizations puzzled about which measures were included and which were removed from the changed 
bill.” Michele Richinick, Georgia ‘guns everywhere’ bill takes effect, MSNBC (July 1, 2014, 7:12 AM), http:// 
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/georgia-guns-everywhere-bill-takes-effect. “Ga. Gov. Nathan Deal signed the . . . 
measure . . . on the last day of the legislative session.” Georgia ‘guns everywhere’ law takes effect, ALJAZEERA 
AM. (July 1, 2014, 8:52 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/1/georgia-guns-everywhere.html. 
 25 At the debate “Gun Rights and Wrongs: Balancing the Interests” held at John Marshall Law School in 
Atlanta, on October 6, 2014, a representative from Moms Demand Action stated that the Act that passed had 
never been seen or read before passage. 
 26 Professor Hanah Metchis Volokh decries the proclivity of legislatures to rush bills through the voting 
process without care, and argues that legislators have a duty to read proposed legislation for the good of the 
political system. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135 (2011). 
She argues for a “rule that requires the full text of a bill to be available to all Members for a reasonable amount 
of time prior to the final floor vote” and that “[s]uch a rule would prevent bills from being rushed through 
without providing at least an opportunity for legislators to read them,” adding that “[t]his rule should be 
nonwaivable, or waivable only in bona-fide emergency situations by a supermajority vote.” Hanah Metchis 
Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 162–63 (2011). 
 27 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SUBSTANCE & 
PROCEDURE 346 (5th ed., 1995). 
 28 Id. at 346–47 (5th ed., 1995) (alteration in original). 
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The huge risk of the Georgia “carry” law is that it will increase the number of 
shootings. People who have guns tend to use them.29 Spouses will shoot spouses 
and children will shoot other children and their parents because of the spread of 
guns outside the home.30 Strangers to the family will also be shot.31 
B. Substantive Due Process 
[‘Substantive due process” is different from “procedural due 
process.”] The concept the Court employs to control the substance of 
legislation under the due process clause is that certain types of 
lawmaking go beyond any proper sphere of governmental activity. In 
short, the Court views the act as incompatible with our democratic 
system of government and individual liberty. The judicial premise 
for this position is that any life, liberty, or property limited by such a 
law is taken without due process because the Constitution never 
granted the government the ability to pass such a law.32 
The Georgia carry law will likely be reviewed for substantive due process 
under the “strict scrutiny test.” [Simply put, strict scrutiny is a basis of review 
that mandates the means used to achieve a compelling government interest 
must be narrowly tailored.33 In other words, the rule must be necessary in order 
to meet a supremely important government goal; there cannot be any 
possibility of a less restrictive alternative.] 
The “strict scrutiny” approach is used for critical statutes dealing with core 
issues such as “fundamental rights” and race.34 Here, the new law will likely 
lead to more deaths so the court will strike it down after very close examination 
under the “strict scrutiny” test. The Court will have to define the interest driving 
 
 29 See Matthew Miller, David Hemenway, & Deborah Azrael, State-level homicide victimization rates in 
the US in relation to survey measures of household firearm ownership, 2001–2003, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 656, 
659–60 (2007) (finding that the states with the highest rate of gun ownership experience firearm homicide rates 
that are 114% higher than states with the lowest rate of gun ownership). 
 30 See id. at 656, 661, 663 (2007) (“Consistent . . . with studies that found a gun in the home was a risk 
factor for homicides in the home perpetrated by family members, intimates or acquaintances . . . we found that 
household firearm prevalence was associated with firearm homicide victimization of women.”) (“Our findings 
that household firearm owner-ship rates are related to firearm and overall homicide rates . . . for women, 
children and men of all ages, even after controlling for several potential confounders previously identified in the 
literature, suggests that household firearms are a direct and an indirect source of firearms used to kill Americans 
both in their homes and on their streets.”) (citation omitted). 
 31 See id. 
 32 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law—Substance & Procedure 346–47 
(5th ed., 1995). 
 33 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 670 3rd ed., 2006). 
 34 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 695 (3rd ed., 2006). 
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the law, and decide if the means it uses to achieve that interest are narrowly 
tailored. Preventing the public funding of racial discrimination,35 protecting the 
rights of “members of groups that have historically been subjected to 
discrimination,” 36  and “procuring the manpower necessary for military 
purposes”37 are all examples of interests that have been deemed compelling. As 
evidenced by these examples, compelling interests are those that are necessary 
for some crucial end, such as preserving fundamental rights or the 
government’s ability to function. 
Carrying a gun in public is not a fundamental right. In the present case, the 
only interest proponents of the new law could cite is the preservation of some 
grossly expanded Second Amendment right such as a right to carry a gun 
anywhere outside the home. However, even the broad decision in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago (2010), allowing the almost unqualified ownership of 
handguns, did not attempt to say there was an absolute right to carry firearms in 
public.38 It is unrealistic to suggest that a court will call the interest in expanding 
Second Amendment rights far beyond their previous bounds “compelling.” 
Even if the reviewing court uses the less demanding “rational basis” test, the 
carry act should fail because people will take their weapons outside their 
homes and into the streets, restaurants, churches, and school parking lots.39 This 
will most likely lead to more shootings and bloodshed. With 15,000 shooting 
deaths per year, the war is at home, not in some foreign country. Quite simply, 
there is no rational basis for the “carry anywhere” act, because instead of 
protecting life it endangers life and will lead to additional bloodshed and deaths. 
For instance, the 11th Circuit has held that excessive force cases, can qualify 
as a denial of substantive due process.40 This decision was based on the idea that 
shooting a citizen “denie[s] his or her constitutional right to life through means 
other than a law enforcement official’s arrest, investigatory stop, or other 
seizure.”41 The victim is denied the proper procedures of law that ensure the 
 
 35 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 36 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 
 37 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). 
 38 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 39 Open Carry Protection Act, 2014 Ga. Laws Act 604, § 16-11-127(b) (2014). 
 40 Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2003). Police officer while hiding in the 
bushes shot suspect; Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1993). The officer opened Wilson’s 
bathroom door and she shot herself. Court held she had not been seized. 
 41 Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 
276 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
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right for him or her to be heard. The 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits all agree with this 
argument.42 
A substantial increase in the risk of being shot should weigh as heavily on 
the minds of the legislators as it does on the people. After all, the Constitution 
clearly provides that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.” 43  Indeed, the Georgia Constitution 
contains a provision that is nearly identical.44 
It might be argued that such due process violations must come from an 
official abuse of power. Indeed, the cases cited above all involve police 
conduct. 45  However, while the 11th Circuit did make it clear that “[t]he 
substantive due process guarantee protects against government power 
arbitrarily and oppressively exercised,” it maintained that unjustified shootings 
fell under that category.46 Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he 
phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than 
those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Ri ghts. 
Its application is less a matter of rule. Unconstitutionality, is to be tested by an 
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.”47 
Thus it can fairly be said that the State’s action in passing this law is 
sufficient to support a due process challenge. After all, the “Carry Everywhere 
Act” greatly increases the likelihood that innocent citizens (those not carrying 
guns) will be denied their rights almost everywhere they go. This law 
encourages the denial of due process for the average citizen. There is nearly a 
direct correlation between the number of guns and shootings in a given area (be 
it an area as small as the home or as large as an entire state).48 By passing this 
Act, the Georgia legislature disregarded the fundamental due process rights of 
its people by encouraging the spread of violence into all areas of public life. 
 
 42 Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1990); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme. 906 F2d 
791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990); Sinaloa Lake Owner’s Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1408 n. 10 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 43 U.SCONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 44 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 45 See generally Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719 
(11th Cir. 1993). Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme. 906 F2d 
791 (1st Cir. 1990); Sinaloa Lake Owner’s Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 46 Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1993). But see infra notes 95–96. 
 47 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998). 
 48 Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, http://smartgunlaws.org/ (last visited Jan 12, 2017). 
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In reviewing the Maryland right to carry law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, in Woollard applied the “intermediate scrutiny” test. “Under 
intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is substantially related to an 
important government purpose.” 49  Thus, intermediate scrutiny is more 
demanding than rational basis review in two ways. First, the government 
interest at stake need be more than merely “legitimate,” it must be fairly 
characterized as “important.” Second, the means to achieve that end must be 
more than merely “rational” or “reasonable.” Instead, they have to be 
“substantially related to obtaining that goal.”50 
Woollard is on point. It involved a challenge to Maryland’s “good and 
substantial reason requirement” for issuing a permit to carry a handgun.51 This 
requirement mandates that, before a permit may be issued, an applicant must 
prove that he or she “has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or 
transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a 
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.” 52  The provision was 
challenged on Second Amendment grounds, and the 4th Circuit granted 
certiorari to determine whether it would survive a Constitutional challenge. 
The facts are that Raymond Woollard and the Second Amendment 
Foundation initiated this action in the District of Maryland asserting “that 
Maryland’s ‘good-and-substantial-reason’ requirement for obtaining a handgun 
permit contravenes the Second Amendment.” 53  Ultimately, the Court in 
Woolla rd noted that “intermediate scrutiny applies ‘to laws that burden [any] 
right to keep and bear arms outside of the home . . . [because] as we move 
outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public 
safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.’” 54  The 
Court expressly denied the argument that strict scrutiny must always apply in 
Second Amendment cases, opting to side with its precedent of applying 
intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on firearms carried outside the home.55 
 
 49 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540 (3rd ed., 2006). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See generally Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 
(2013). 
 52 Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 53  Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d at 870.  
 54 Id. at 876 (quoting U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 55 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d at 877–78. Because “the state cannot have an interest in suppressing a 
fundamental right.” 
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It may be successfully argued, then, that it would be rational, for Georgia to 
limit its concealed carry policy in a similar way. For instance, the “Guns 
Everywhere Act” does not really concern protection of the home at all. It deals 
exclusively with expanding areas where guns may be carried outside of the 
home. 56  Thus, it would merit intermediate scrutiny under the Woollard 
framework. 
Furthermore, for the purpose of intermediate scrutiny, Maryland’s interest in 
“protecting public safety” associated with carrying guns outside sufficed as an 
important government interest.57 The Court found that interest to be served by 
enforcement of the “good-and-substantial-reason requirement.”58 The Supreme 
Court denied Certiorari in Woollard.59 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution ensures that no state may “deny any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”60 Georgia’s Constitution contains a similar 
provision, which states, “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the 
laws.”61 
The concept behind equal protection is that the government should treat all 
persons equally.62 Generally, equal protection claims are raised over legislation 
that classifies or identifies certain groups for certain benefits, while denying 
others that same benefit. For example, equal protection concerns have 
historically been raised over legislation that discriminates on the basis of race63 
or gender.64 More generally, equal protection means that the government may 
not deny any group a fundamental right, such as the right to marry or procreate, 
without a compelling reason.65 
 
 56 Open Carry Protection Act, 2014 Ga. Laws Act 604, § 16-11-127(b) (2014). 
 57 See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d at 876–77. 
 58 See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d at 879–80. 
 59 Woollard v. Gallagher, 134 S.Ct. 422 (2013). 
 60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 61 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 488 
(1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880). 
 64 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520–21 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976). 
 65 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 376–77, 388 (1978); See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942). 
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For instance, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court struck down a law 
that mandated the sterilization of “habitual criminals.”66 In its decision, the 
Court stressed the fact that the right to procreate was fundamental to human 
existence.67 As such, the Court held, a law may not deny any one group the 
equal protection of a right fundamental to human existence without a 
compelling reason.68 Thirty-five years later, the Court added to this decision, in 
Zablocki v. Redhail. There, the Court held it impermissible to deny a certain 
class of citizens the right to marry without explicit court approval.69 The Court 
once again named marriage as a fundamental right, and cautioned against the 
proscription of any such right.70 
In like manner, when a person on the street (perhaps an innocent bystander) 
is shot, she can argue that she was not treated equally because she was 
unarmed. The “carry everywhere” law singles out those citizens who are not 
armed with guns for unequal deprivation of arguably the most fundamental 
right: one’s right to live without fear of physical and emotional harm or death. 
In effect, it forces everyone, even those who are opposed to handguns, to carry 
one. It is a superficial argument that those who object to the act can buy a gun. 
The opponent may refuse to purchase a gun because she realizes that having a 
gun in the home triples the risk of being shot and may increase the risk of being 
shot in a domestic argument by 500%.71 She realizes that having a gun is a bad 
idea. Thus such a law endangers those who realize the risks of gun ownership 
and refuse to own one.72 
The Georgia Act drives the sales of more guns, which is the goal of NRA 
lobbying.73 The NRA is, at its base, a trade association of gun manufacturers.74 
 
 66 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 536, 541 ( The law had exempted white collar criminals from the 
requirement). 
 67 Id. at 541. 
 68 See Id. at 540–41. 
 69 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375–77. 
 70 Id. at 384; See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
 71 J.C. Campbell et al., Risk factors for femicide within physically abusive intimate relationships: results 
from a multi-site case control study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003); see also Matthew Miller, 
Deborah Azrael, & David Hemenway, Firearm Availability and Suicide, Homicide, and Unintentional Firearm 
Deaths Among Women, 79 J. Urb. Health 26, 34 (2002) (finding that women are 4.9 times more likely to be 
killed by a firearm in states where gun ownership is prevalent).  
 72 A professor at the University of Texas recently resigned because he feared being shot by one of his 500 
students. Texas passed a “Carry Law” similar to Georgia. CNN, Oct. 20, 2015. 
 73 See Josh Sugarmann, The NRA: Gun Industry Trade Association Masqerading as a Shooting Sports 
Foundation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-
sugarmann/the-nra-gun-industry-trad_b_5212780.html (detailing the exorbitant amount of funding the NRA 
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It lobbies to make certain gun control laws remain lax, so that more guns will 
be sold.75 
IV. ACCESS TO COURTS 
In addition to its guarantee of equal protection, Georgia’s Constitution also 
guarantees that “[n]o person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or 
defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the 
Courts of this state.”76 The concept behind the “access to courts” provision is 
that each person who suffers injury has a right to use the courts to obtain 
justice. In fact, the Supreme Court recognized that “The right to sue and defend 
in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right 
[above] all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is 
one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship . . .”77 However, 
with legislation like the “Carry Everywhere Act” it is becoming close to 
impossible for citizens to go to court when they are faced with gun violence. 
Simply put, when the victim is dead she cannot take the issue to court. 
More guns carried in public means more opportunities to take away the 
victim’s Constitutional right to argue her case in court.78 Proponents of the Bill 
argue that self-defense is a foundational right. They ignore the equal right of 
the victim not to be shot and killed.79 The Declaration of Independence states 
that “life is an unalienable right.”80 People who own guns tend to use them to 
 
receives from gun manufacturers). The support of the NRA is effectively bought and paid for by these gun 
manufacturers. 
 74 See Josh Sugarmann, The NRA: Gun Industry Trade Association Masqerading as a Shooting Sports 
Foundation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-
sugarmann/the-nra-gun-industry-tradb_5212780.html (noting the vast contributions firearms manufacturers 
make to the NRA in exchange for the organization’s focus on promoting “trade shows” billed as “meetings”). 
 75 See Sturm, Ruger & Company Raises Over $1.2 Million to Benefit the NRA Institute for Legislative 
Action, NRA-ILA (April 25, 2012), htt ps:/ /www.nraila.or g/artic les/20120425/sturm- ruger- c ompan y-raises-ov e r-
12-mill ion-to-bene fit- the-n ra-institu te-f or-le gisl ative-ac tion (describing that the purpose of the NRA Institute for 
Legislative Action is to lobby against gun control, and detailing the $1.2 million dollars the organization made 
directly off the sale of over one million firearms). 
 76 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 77 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
 78 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 879–80 (4th Cir. 2013) (enumerating several of the dangers 
inherent to carrying firearms in public). 
 79 See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll men . . . are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights . . . Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
 80 Id. 
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shoot people. 81  Free countries such as Australia, England and Japan reject 
“carry anywhere” laws and have extensive gun control.82 They have almost no 
gun deaths.83 Visiting these countries carries almost no risk of being shot. 
Fewer guns on the streets will provide time for the potential victims to gain 
access to the courts to challenge the shooter and argue defenses for the victim. 
The courts are the proper venue for serious disagreements, not the streets, 
restaurants, churches, and school parking lots. 84  The expansion of the 
possession of guns in public will greatly tend to displace the courts. 
V. SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Courts often strike down legislation that only applies to a very small group.85 
This is called “special legislation.”86 Here the “carry” act is special in that it 
only benefits a small group—those who want to carry guns in public. While it 
might be argued that all of society benefits from the “protection” provided by 
upstanding citizens carrying weapons in public, a recent study has shown that 
“for each percentage point increase in gun ownership, the firearm homicide rate 
 
 81 See Matthew Miller, David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael, State-level homicide victimization rates in 
the US in relation to survey measures of household firearm ownership, 2001–2003, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 656, 
659–60 (2007) (finding that the states with the highest rate of gun ownership experience firearm homicide rates 
that are 114% higher than states with the lowest rate of gun ownership). 
 82 Australasian Police Ministers’ Council, Special Firearms Meeting: The National Agreement on Firearms 
§ 3 (1996) (noting that “personal protection [is not] a genuine reason for owning, possessing or using a 
firearm”), available at http://www.austli i.edu.a u/au/ ot her/a pmc/; Max Fisher, A Land Without Guns: How Japan 
Has Virtually Eliminated Shooting Deaths, The Atlantic (July 23, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2012/07/a-land-without-guns-how-japan-has-virtually-eliminated-shooting-dealths/260189/ 
(describing Japan as “the developed world’s least firearm-filled nation and perhaps its strictest controller,” and 
highlighting that only 11 people were killed by gun violence in Japan during 2011); Firearms Act, c. 27, § 19 
(Eng.) (prohibiting the carrying of firearms in any public place). 
 83 Simon Rogers, Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership by Country, Guardian (July 22, 2012, 8:01 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jul/22/gun-homicides-ownership-world-list (demonstrating 
that Australia, England, and Japan each only have firearm homicide rates of .07, and .01 per 100,000 people, 
respectively, compared to the U.S. rate of 2.97 homicides per 100,000 people). 
 84 Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, The Supreme Court’s Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and 
Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193, 199 (2010) (“[T]ort law ‘promotes the law’s 
civilizing function’ and protects individual freedom, autonomy, and self-actualization by vindicating ‘private 
personality and emotional security, . . . the right to be let alone.’”) (citation omitted). 
 85 See Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (holding a statute that 
singled out medical negligence plaintiffs for different treatment constituted special legislation); Best v. Taylor 
Mach. Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 390 (Ill. 1997) (holding a statute limiting compensatory damages to constitute 
special legislation on the grounds that it only benefitted a certain number of tortfeasors); Adams v. Harris 
County, 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. App. 1975). 
 86 Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (Ill. 1997) (defining special legislation as “arbitrary 
legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis”). 
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increased by .9%,” thus debunking the idea that more guns equal safer 
citizens. 87 For the rest of society carrying guns in public is unwanted, will 
greatly increase the dangers of going about in public [church, restaurants, school 
parking lots] and leads to morbid results—dangerous “guns everywhere and 
increased violence.”88 For these reasons the new Georgia “carry” law should be 
struck down as unconstitutional special legislation. 
A. Precedent 
1. Places of Worship, Restaurants and Bars 
In Georgia Carry Org, Inc. the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
previous carry Act’s 89  provision that gave churches the power to exclude 
persons carrying guns from the premises did not violate the Second 
Amendment. 90  The court rested its decision on a property owner’s right to 
control his property, and will therefore lead to the striking down of the bars and 
restaurants provisions of the new Act, as well.91 The point is that the 2014 
Georgia Law is backwards. It places the duty to exclude guns on the property 
owner. Instead the gun owner should have to ask for permission before taking a 
gun inside a building. Bars and restaurants might have their “No Guns” signs 
stolen or destroyed. The persons who totes the gun should have the burden of 
obtaining consent in each location not the other way around. 
The 11th Circuit Reasoned: 
Plaintiffs allege “the Carry law infringes on the rights of Plaintiffs to keep 
and bear arms, in violation of the Second Amendment, by prohibiting them from 
possessing weapons in a place of worship.” 
. . . 
Plaintiffs must argue that the individual right protected by the Second 
Amendment, in light of Heller and McDonald, trumps a private property 
 
 87 Michael Seigel, Craig S. Ross, & Charles King III, The Relationship Between Gun Ownership and 
Firearm Homicide Rates in the United States, 1981–2010, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2098, 2098 (2013). 
 88 See supra notes 13, 26–28, 75. 
 89 Specifically, O.C.G.A § 16-11-127(b). 
 90 GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A place of worship’s right, 
rooted in the common law, to forbid possession of firearms on its property is entirely consistent with the Second 
Amendment.”). 
 91 GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1262 n. 37 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that private 
property owners may forbid the possession of a weapon). 
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owner’s right to exclusively control who is allowed on his or her own premises. 
Thus, property law, tort law, and criminal law provide the canvas on which our 
Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment. A clear grasp of this 
background illustrates that the pre-existing right codified in the Second 
Amendment does not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in a place 
of worship against the owner’s wishes. Quite simply, there is no constitutional 
infirmity when a private property owner exercises his, or her, or its—in the case 
of a place of worship—right to control who may enter, and whether that invited 
guest can be armed. 
. . . 
An individual’s right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment, 
whatever its full scope, certainly must be limited by the equally fundamental 
right of a private owner to exercise exclusive dominion and control over his land. 
The Founding Fathers placed the right to private property upon the highest of 
pedestals, standing side by side with the right to personal security that 
underscores the Second Amendment. As Blackstone observed, 
[T]hese fundamental rights may be reduced to three principal or 
primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal 
liberty; and the right of private property: because as there is no other 
known method of compulsion, or of abridging man’s natural free will, 
but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these 
important rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be 
said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their 
largest and most extensive sense. 
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *129. 
. . . 
(“The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred 
as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to 
protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”) James Madison, Property (1762), 
reprinted in 6 The Writings of James Madison 101, 102 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906. 
. . . 
Plaintiffs, in essence, ask us to turn Heller on its head by interpreting the 
Second Amendment to destroy one cornerstone of liberty—the right to enjoy 
one’s private property—in order to expand another—the right to bear arms. 
. . . 
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When the Second Amendment is understood in its proper historical context, 
it becomes readily apparent that the Amendment codified a pre-existing right 
that was circumscribed by the common law rights of an owner under property 
law, tort law, and criminal law. Heller’s expounding of the pre-existing right 
enshrined in the Second Amendment does nothing to change this. 
. . . 
We conclude that the Second Amendment does not give an individual a 
right to carry a firearm on a place of worship’s premises against the owner’s 
wishes because such right did not pre-exist the Amendment’s adoption.92 
2. Maryland—Woollard 
The Georgia Carry Law rests on a false assumption. That assumption is that 
D.C. v. Heller applies outside the home. Woollard v. Gallagher, in the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, restricts Heller largely to the home. In 
Maryland in order to obtain a permit to carry, the person must have “a good and 
substantial reason” to carry the gun beyond the home. The Court in Woollard 
reasoned as follows: 
The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 
5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions 
eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in 
public on having “good and substantial reason” to do so. Necessary to 
the entry of the court’s injunction was its trailblazing pronouncement 
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense extends outside the home, as well as its 
determination that such right is impermissibly burdened by Maryland’s 
good-and-substantial-reason requirement. Because we disagree 
with the court’s conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason 
requirement cannot pass constitutional muster, we reverse the 
judgment. 
. . . 
Under its permitting scheme, Maryland obliges “[a] person [to] 
have a permit issued . . . before the person carries, wears, or transports a 
handgun.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-303. 
. . . 
 
 92 GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260–66 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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Pursuant to the good-and-substantial-reason requirement, permit 
eligibility also necessitates the Secretary’s finding, following an 
investigation, that the applicant has good and substantial reason to 
wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the 
permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended 
danger.93 
In Woollard, the petition claimed that the Second Amendment was absolute 
and applied beyond the home. The 4th circuit rejected this: 
We now know . . . the Second Amendment guarantees the right of 
individuals to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense. 
See 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Heller, however, was principally 
concerned with the “core protection” of the Second Amendment: 
“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home.” 
. . . 
Two years after issuing its Heller decision, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), the Supreme Court . . . recognized, 
however, that “the Second Amendment right is fully applicable 
to the States,” and reiterated Heller’s holding “that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home 
for the purpose of self- defense.” Accordingly, “a considerable 
degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of [the Heller] right 
beyond the home.” . . . (What we know from [Heller and 
McDonald] is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith 
within the home). 
. . . 
The State has clearly demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-
reason requirement advances the objectives of protecting public 
safety and preventing crime because it reduces the number of 
handguns carried in public. That is, limiting the public carrying of 
handguns protects citizens and inhibits crime by: 
• Decreasing the availability of handguns to criminals via theft . . . 
• Lessening “the likelihood that basic confrontations between 
individuals would turn deadly.” (“The presence of a handgun in 
an altercation, however petty, greatly increases the likelihood that 
it will escalate into lethal violence.”) (“Incidents such as bar fights 
 
 93 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-
306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2014), Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-303 (LexisNexis 2014)). 
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and road rage that now often end with people upset, but not 
lethally wounded, take on deadly implications when handguns are 
involved.”) 
. . . 
• Curtailing the presence of handguns during routine police-
citizen encounters. (“If the number of legal handguns on the 
streets increased significantly, [police] officers would have no 
choice but to take extra precautions before engaging citizens, 
effectively treating encounters between police and the community 
that now are routine, friendly, and trusting, as high-risk stops, 
which demand a much more rigid protocol and a strategic 
approach.”); 
• Reducing the number of “handgun sightings” that must be 
investigated [by the police].94 
For these reasons the 4th Circuit upheld the “good-and-substantial-reason” 
standard contained in the Maryland “carry” law. 
3. New York—Kachalsky 
New York adopted a carry law that required “proper cause” to be shown 
before a permit can be issued.95 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
an absolute interpretation of Heller. In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit upheld the 
“proper cause” requirement for a gun permit and agreed that before a permit 
issues the petitioner must show “a special need for self-protection—as a 
prerequisite for a license to carry a concealed handgun in public.”96 This is a 
more rational approach than Georgia’s unique and extreme view that any gun 
can be carried almost anywhere. Woollard and Kachalsky nicely balance the 
Second Amendment right with the risk to the public of more guns being carried 
outside the home. 
 
 94 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874, 879–80 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)) (alteration in original). 
 95 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (Consol. 2014). 
 96 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83–84 (2nd Cir. 2012). It is worth noting here that in 
Australia, personal protection is not even considered “a genuine reason for owning, possessing or using a 
firearm. Australasian Police Ministers’ Council, Special Firearms Meeting § 3 (1996), available at h ttp 
://www.austl ii.edu.au/ au/o ther/a pmc/ . 
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VI. STATE ACTION 
The “State Action” concept is sometimes a problem in constitutional 
challenge cases.97 It is not here because of the many substantial actions by the 
state. First, drafting and passing the act. Second, forcing persons who choose to 
go about in public to endure an increased risk of death, injury and terror from 
guns. Third, actively implementing and funding the system for granting phony 
permits. Fourth, forcing the state, cities, and counties to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars on personnel, training and new guns to deal with the influx of 
more guns. Fifth, the Act coerces persons who don’t want guns, to buy them. 
Professor Chemerinsky argues that the time has come to abandon the “state 
action doctrine” and consider the Constitutional challenge on its merits: 
The ability of the federal government, both through the judiciary and 
the legislature, to protect rights from private interference is 
determined, in large part, by the definition of state action. The state 
action doctrines remain the dividing line between the public 
sector, which is controlled by the Constitution, and the private 
sector, which is not. Courts continually face countless cases 
posing the question whether the Constitution’s protections should 
be applied to limit the conduct of nongovernmental actions. 
I suggest that it is time to begin rethinking state action. It is time to 
again ask why infringements of the most basic values—speech, 
privacy and equality—should be tolerated just because the violator 
is a private entity rather than the government. 
Thus, the state action doctrine is based on the anachronistic premise 
of a common law that is coextensive with individual liberties. 
Second, the literature on state action has completely ignored the 
jurisprudential question of why rights are protected. I contend that 
by any theory of rights—natural law, positivism, or consensus—the 
state action requirement makes no sense. The conclusion which 
emerges is that limiting the Constitution’s protections of individual 
rights to state action is anachronistic, harmful to the most important 
personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to 
the very goals that it originally intended to accomplish. 
If the state action requirement were abolished, the courts in each 
instance would determine whether the infringer’s freedom 
adequately justified permitting the alleged violation. Eliminating 
the concept of state action merely means that the courts would 
 
 97 See, Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 503 (1985). 
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have to reach the merits and decide if a sufficient justification exists; 
courts could not dismiss cases based solely on the lack of 
governmental involvement. 
[M]y central thesis is that rights are protected by courts in 
order to safeguard values regarded as fundamental. Because these 
values are so important, any infringement should be suspect. 
Protection of these values from private infringements need not 
necessarily be by constitutional review; protection can be provided 
by state statute, state common law, or federal statute. What is 
essential is that protection is indeed provided. The state action 
requirement is undesirable because it requires courts to refrain from 
applying constitutional values to private disputes even though 
there is no other form of effective redress.98 
CONCLUSION 
Because the “carry” laws will needlessly add to the carnage, and are 
unconstitutional, they should be struck down. The state legislatures should be 
required by the courts to begin anew and asked to keep in mind the Maryland 
and New York gun permit provisions that require “proper cause” be shown by 
the owner in order to take a gun outside the home. Of course, it is a fair 
question why corporations that manufacture hand guns and rapid fire weapons 
do not produce safer guns, and end their support for “carry everywhere” 
legislation on their own—without the intervention of civil suits? 
 
 98 Id. At 504–07. 
